CMSA Social Science Applications Forum: Convergence of Large Population Games to Mean Field Games with Interaction Through the Controls

CMSA EVENTS

Speaker:

Ludovic Tangpi - Princeton University

This work considers stochastic differential games with a large number of players, whose costs and dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. We develop a framework to prove convergence of finite-player games to the asymptotic mean field game. Our approach is based on the concept of propagation of chaos for forward and backward weakly interacting particles which we investigate by fully probabilistic methods, and which appear to be of independent interest. These propagation of chaos arguments allow to derive moment and concentration bounds for the convergence of both Nash equilibria and social optima in non-cooperative and cooperative games, respectively. Incidentally, we also obtain convergence of a system of second order parabolic partial differential equations on finite dimensional spaces to a second order parabolic partial differential equation on the Wasserstein space.

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Zoom: https://harvard.zoom.us/j/95475021655